It is always charming to watch a problem be solved by carefully avoiding the solution.
There exist lattice-based constructions, hash-based signatures, and other quantum-resistant schemes—some of them, quite inconveniently, resting on assumptions more conservative and structurally robust than those underpinning ECDSA itself. One might imagine that, in a moment of earnest concern for “security,” these would be the natural candidates.
And yet, they are not the ones being selected.
Pause on that.
In all this breathless discussion about securing "Bitcoin" BTC, about safeguarding assets, about defending the system from theoretical adversaries, the algorithms being proposed are not the most robust available—even within the very class being invoked. They are not the ones with the strongest classical assurances. They are not the ones that reduce reliance on brittle assumptions or implementation fragility.
They are, rather awkwardly, weaker in a classical sense.
So one is left with a rather delicate question: if the goal were truly to increase security, why not choose the most secure options available?
Especially when the supposed threat—the great spectre invoked to justify all of this—remains entirely unproven in any practical form.
Remove that spectre, and what remains is quite stark: a proposal to replace a well-understood, extensively analysed system with something demonstrably less secure against the attacks that actually exist.
It is at this point that one must resist the temptation to call it an accident.
For systems are rarely degraded by mistake. They are, far more often, adjusted in ways that serve purposes politely left unstated.
And so one observes, with a certain detached amusement, that in the name of security, something less secure is proposed; in the name of prudence, something speculative is prioritised; and in the name of progress, something demonstrably inferior is advanced.
It would be absurd, were it not so deliberate.
One is almost compelled to admire the elegance of it: to argue for protection while quietly selecting vulnerability, and to do so with such conviction that the audience applauds the performance rather than examining the script.
Think about why that might be.
S. Tominaga, alias CSW
17 de abril de 2026
https://x.com/i/status/2044975200870297607
https://t.me/S_Tominaga/5287
There exist lattice-based constructions, hash-based signatures, and other quantum-resistant schemes—some of them, quite inconveniently, resting on assumptions more conservative and structurally robust than those underpinning ECDSA itself. One might imagine that, in a moment of earnest concern for “security,” these would be the natural candidates.
And yet, they are not the ones being selected.
Pause on that.
In all this breathless discussion about securing "Bitcoin" BTC, about safeguarding assets, about defending the system from theoretical adversaries, the algorithms being proposed are not the most robust available—even within the very class being invoked. They are not the ones with the strongest classical assurances. They are not the ones that reduce reliance on brittle assumptions or implementation fragility.
They are, rather awkwardly, weaker in a classical sense.
So one is left with a rather delicate question: if the goal were truly to increase security, why not choose the most secure options available?
Especially when the supposed threat—the great spectre invoked to justify all of this—remains entirely unproven in any practical form.
Remove that spectre, and what remains is quite stark: a proposal to replace a well-understood, extensively analysed system with something demonstrably less secure against the attacks that actually exist.
It is at this point that one must resist the temptation to call it an accident.
For systems are rarely degraded by mistake. They are, far more often, adjusted in ways that serve purposes politely left unstated.
And so one observes, with a certain detached amusement, that in the name of security, something less secure is proposed; in the name of prudence, something speculative is prioritised; and in the name of progress, something demonstrably inferior is advanced.
It would be absurd, were it not so deliberate.
One is almost compelled to admire the elegance of it: to argue for protection while quietly selecting vulnerability, and to do so with such conviction that the audience applauds the performance rather than examining the script.
Think about why that might be.
S. Tominaga, alias CSW
17 de abril de 2026
https://x.com/i/status/2044975200870297607
https://t.me/S_Tominaga/5287
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