But maybe we have learned another lesson too. The concentration of power in the hands of so few may be efficient and sometimes popular. But it does not tend toward sound government. However wise one person or his advisors may be, that is no substitute for the wisdom of the whole of the American people that can be tapped in the legislative process. Decisions produced by those who indulge no criticism are rarely as good as those produced after robust and uncensored debate. Decisions announced on the fly are rarely as wise as those that come after careful deliberation. Decisions made by a few often yield unintended consequences that may be avoided when more are consulted. Autocracies have always suffered these defects. Maybe, hopefully, we have relearned these lessons too.
毫無疑問,我們可以從這段歷史中學到很多教訓,希望人們日後能夠認真去來研究。其中一個教訓大概是:恐懼和對安全的渴望是強大的力量。只要有人針對這種威脅做出某個舉動,就會引發一連串的行動。一個領袖或專家聲稱他掌握著解決一切問題的答案,前提是我們必須按照他的指示去行事,這個人就有可能成爲一股無法抗拒的力量。用不着面對刺刀,我們只需要一點點的推動,就會自覺自願地放棄由民選代表來立法的傳統,轉而接受獨裁統治。在這一過程中,我們將失去寶貴的公民自由權利,包括宗教、對政府政策不受約束的評論、與朋友家人相聚、甚至僅僅是離開家門。我們甚至會為那些要求無視正常的立法程序和放棄個人自由的人喝彩。當然,這并不是一件新鮮事情。古人早就警告過,在恐懼之下,民主制度會退化為威權主義。不過也許我們也學到了另外一個教訓。少數人集權可能產生高效率,甚至收到大衆歡迎。但那樣產生的政府是不健全也不明智的。無論一個人或者他身邊的顧問有多聰明,都無法取代全體美國人的智慧。這種集體智慧能夠通過立法程序來體現。沒有經過批評的決定極少能與那些經過充分辯論與審視的政策相匹敵。而匆忙的決定也不會像那些經過仔細考慮的決策那般明智。少數人的決策往往會有無法預見的後果,而如果有充分咨詢,那些後果恐怕能夠避免。威權主義總是有這一類的缺陷。希望我們能夠吸取這些教訓。
In the 1970s, Congress studied the use of emergency decrees. It observed that they can allow executive authorities to tap into extraordinary powers. Congress also observed that emergency decrees have a habit of long outliving the crises that generate them; some federal emergency proclamations, Congress noted, had remained in effect for years or decades after the emergency in question had passed. At the same time, Congress recognized that quick unilateral executive action is sometimes necessary and permitted in our constitutional order. In an effort to balance these considerations and ensure a more normal operation of our laws and a firmer protection of our liberties, Congress adopted a number of new guardrails in the National Emergencies Act.
在1970年代,國會對緊急行政手段進行了研究。他們看到,這類命令會給予行政部門以極大的特權。國會也看到,此類緊急行政命令通常在危機過後還會存在很長時間。有的緊急命令甚至在危機之後還有效存在了幾十年。不過國會同時也認識到,在我們的憲法框架中,有時候行政部門采取迅速應對是由必要而且被允許的。爲了平衡各方面的因素,缺乏法律正常運作並鑒定地保護自由,國會為《國家緊急狀態法案》中增加了一系列監管措施。
Despite that law, the number of declared emergencies has only grown in the ensuing years. And it is hard not to wonder whether, after nearly a half century and in light of our Nation’s recent experience, another look is warranted. It is hard not to wonder, too, whether state legislatures might profitably reexamine the proper scope of emergency executive powers at the state level. At the very least, one can hope that the Judiciary will not soon again allow itself to be part of the problem by permitting litigants to manipulate our docket to perpetuate a decree designed for one emergency to address another. Make no mistake—decisive executive action is sometimes necessary and appropriate. But if emergency decrees promise to solve some problems, they threaten to generate others. And rule by indefinite emergency edict risks leaving all of us with a shell of a democracy and civil liberties just as hollow.
儘管有這個立法,行政部門宣佈緊急情況的次數在接下來的幾十年裡只增不減。經過半個世紀之後,再考慮到我們最近的經歷,不禁讓人想到是否有必要重新審視這一情況。人們也不禁懷疑,在州的層面上,各州立法機構是否有必要重新審視緊急行政權力的適當範圍。至少,我們期待司法機構不會再次允許自身被操控,利用法庭判決來將應付緊急狀態的緊急行政命令永久化。不錯,行政部門采取果斷行動有時是必須的。但是,緊急行政命令如果能解決一些問題,同時也會導致另一些問題。而利用無限期的緊急行政命令來進行統治,那有可能會導致民主制度以及公民自由變成徒有虛名。
https://twitter.com/Sasha_Gong/status/1660465216709091328?s=19

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