#abstract
In this talk, I will discuss two ways in which one might treat counterevidence conservatively, namely, by what Gilbert Harman has called accepting something as full-belief, and by exhibiting what is known as biased assimilation in the social psychology literature. I first discuss the normative natures of these practices and will argue that, despite their opposing natures, when rational, they can both be reduced to the same general principle of practical rationality together with other auxiliary facts about epistemic rationality. I then consider the important worry that these practices might introduce an undue level of path-dependency to our epistemic conditions. I will argue that, initial appearances to the contrary, such path-dependency will be mitigated by considerations of simplicity and precision in the long run.
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🆔: @philsharif
In this talk, I will discuss two ways in which one might treat counterevidence conservatively, namely, by what Gilbert Harman has called accepting something as full-belief, and by exhibiting what is known as biased assimilation in the social psychology literature. I first discuss the normative natures of these practices and will argue that, despite their opposing natures, when rational, they can both be reduced to the same general principle of practical rationality together with other auxiliary facts about epistemic rationality. I then consider the important worry that these practices might introduce an undue level of path-dependency to our epistemic conditions. I will argue that, initial appearances to the contrary, such path-dependency will be mitigated by considerations of simplicity and precision in the long run.
—————
🆔: @philsharif
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