#چکیده
🔴 دومین پیش‌ارائه‌ی مدرسه‌ی علوم شناختی و فلسفه: رویکردهای 4E
✅ Dewey on the Extended Mind: Changes and Affordances
👤 ارائه‌کننده: محمود شعبانی(کارشناسی ارشد فلسفه علم دانشگاه آزاد، واحد علوم و تحقیقات)
🖊 چکیده:
🔹 John Dewey's account on mind, a pioneer of the view that currently known as “extended mind,” led Godfrey-Smith to reconsider a previously sketched taxonomy between different kinds of change, i.e., Real change versus Cambridge change. (Godfrey‐Smith 2013). In Godfrey-Smith's reading of Dewey, Real changes are made to objects by thought even before any new actions have been performed. However, most of the previous philosophers, notably Geach, attempted to attribute this kind of change as a mere Cambridge change, not a Real one. In this presentation, I will seek to show that 1) Ontologically, previous Geachian ascription is inaccurate so Dewey is on the right track; I will employ the Gibson’s affordances theory and present some cases to defend Dewey’s idea. 2) however, epistemically, we can relinquish and deviate from this right track and preserve Cambridge/real change dichotomy; in doing so, I will use a) Dewey’s evolutionary standpoint and b) the “right to ignore” promoted by Kronfeldner (2018). Finally, I will further divide Cambridge changes into Geachian and Deweyan ones.
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❗️ شرکت در این برنامه برای عموم آزاد و رایگان است. جهت ثبت‌نام به لینک زیر مراجعه بفرمایید(ثبت‌نام الزامی است):
📎 https://b2n.ir/629382
❓ جهت کسب اطلاعات بیشتر به آیدی @behzadface پیام دهید.
———————
🆔: @philsharif
🔴 دومین پیش‌ارائه‌ی مدرسه‌ی علوم شناختی و فلسفه: رویکردهای 4E
✅ Dewey on the Extended Mind: Changes and Affordances
👤 ارائه‌کننده: محمود شعبانی(کارشناسی ارشد فلسفه علم دانشگاه آزاد، واحد علوم و تحقیقات)
🖊 چکیده:
🔹 John Dewey's account on mind, a pioneer of the view that currently known as “extended mind,” led Godfrey-Smith to reconsider a previously sketched taxonomy between different kinds of change, i.e., Real change versus Cambridge change. (Godfrey‐Smith 2013). In Godfrey-Smith's reading of Dewey, Real changes are made to objects by thought even before any new actions have been performed. However, most of the previous philosophers, notably Geach, attempted to attribute this kind of change as a mere Cambridge change, not a Real one. In this presentation, I will seek to show that 1) Ontologically, previous Geachian ascription is inaccurate so Dewey is on the right track; I will employ the Gibson’s affordances theory and present some cases to defend Dewey’s idea. 2) however, epistemically, we can relinquish and deviate from this right track and preserve Cambridge/real change dichotomy; in doing so, I will use a) Dewey’s evolutionary standpoint and b) the “right to ignore” promoted by Kronfeldner (2018). Finally, I will further divide Cambridge changes into Geachian and Deweyan ones.
—————————
❗️ شرکت در این برنامه برای عموم آزاد و رایگان است. جهت ثبت‌نام به لینک زیر مراجعه بفرمایید(ثبت‌نام الزامی است):
📎 https://b2n.ir/629382
❓ جهت کسب اطلاعات بیشتر به آیدی @behzadface پیام دهید.
———————
🆔: @philsharif
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